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The secular state is the most important of contemporary institutional forms available to deal with 
the problem of sectarian violence in liberal democracies. Despite this, the commitment to 
constitutional secularism seems to be in crisis, constituting deep fault lines in democratic politics 
across the world. Within the Euro-American context the secular state seems to have run into 
trouble with immigrants, especially Islamic communities. Beyond its founding context, well-
directed postcolonial polemic in countries like India has seriously questioned the very usefulness of 
the secular state for non-Western polities. As an avowedly secular state it therefore seems crucial 
for a profoundly diverse country like India to able to think through the extent to which the secular 
state can be defended against some of the challenges being mounted against it. This paper 
contributes to this contemporary debate on secularism by discussing the claims to an ‘exceptional’ 
model of Indian secularism made by the Indian Supreme Court. In doing so it argues with the 
court on the routes by which such an exceptional model can be (if at all) elaborated and defended. 
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Introduction 
 
On the 11th of February 2006 the Economist newspaper published a lead article on the prophet 
Muhammad cartoon controversy that gripped most of western Europe and even parts of North 
America1. The article began with a satirical reading of a reasonably well-known quote by Voltaire 
which read “I disagree with what you say and even if you are threatened with death I will not 
defend very strongly your right to say it”. This parody of Volataire was intended to convey to its 
audience the tragically weak willed responses of European governments to the controversy. A 
weakness the Economist claimed was threatening a cardinal value of liberal society – That is, the 
commitment to freedom of speech. Though one could dismiss the newspapers position as a 
touch too alarmist it is hardly far fetched to suppose that it does amplify a general sense of 
unease and threat across much of western Europe. This paper speaks to this sense of unease by 
trying to follow the implications of what it might mean to take the sense of threat to liberal 
values seriously. That is, to attempt identification of the limits of liberal society and the 
conditions within which it can be rendered intelligible. 
 
The paper is organised in the following manner. First it will briefly run through the range within 
which liberal democracies respond to the kind of problem thrown up by the cartoon 
controversy. Second it runs through the Indian constitutional scheme on religion and the 
manner in which contrast to liberal values. Third it tries to speculate on what we might make of 
the contrast of the Indian case. All along the paper presumes the equivalence of liberal society 
and secular society. Liberal society being the social form derived from Europe’s attempt to build 
societies where confessional allegiances were irrelevant to civic governance from around the 16th 
and 17th centuries. Very roughly invocation of either of these terms is intended to convey a 
commitment to the values of liberty and fairness. 
 
 
The Problem 
 
The cartoon controversy as well as other similar cases like the French ban on wearing religious 
markers in public schools and in the more distant past the case of Salman Rushdie’s offending 
book the Satanic Verses have all been characterised in western liberal societies as exemplifying a 
particular kind of problem. Viz. How to accommodate minority communities or positions within 
liberal society?  
 
The range of answers to this question within a liberal society is popularly organised under the 
debate termed multiculturalism. A debate conducted between poles styled the libertarian and the 
communitarian positions2. Very generally the libertarian position emphasises the individual as 
the sole locus of universal rights allowing no such concession to particular communities. This 
position advocates for the creation of a neutral public sphere where particular notions of the 
good life (religion being one such conception of the good life) are bracketed off from public 
deliberation. On the other hand the communitarian position allows for some concessions to 
particular communities and argues for working through contentious issues through public 
deliberation. However no concession granted to particular communities can be inconsistent with 
liberal values of freedom and fairness. 
                                                 
1 Lead Article in Economist, February 11th-17th 2006., p. 11. 
2 A good example of the contours of these contending positions can be found in the exchange between Chandran 
Kukathas and Will Kymlicka. Political Theory, v.20 no.2, (1992). 
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In our cartoon example a libertarian position would strongly emphasise the right free speech and 
therefore will be more accepting of the blasphemous consequences that might follow. A 
communitarian position on the other hand would be a little less generous with free speech and 
will try and argue the need for provisions against hate speech. One way or the other it is 
important to emphasise that both positions are only variations of the more general liberal model 
and that both positions are grounded on a commitment to liberty of individual citizens and equal 
treatment of citizens. 
 
Presumably, in responding to the cartoon controversy the Liberals believe that the terms of 
resolution that we have just outlined above are being threatened by adverse Muslim responses to 
the liberal emphasis on freedom. On their part Muslims see these responses as blasphemous and 
it is the very terms of the liberal resolution (i.e. of supposed indifference of the liberal state) of 
the cartoons incident that some (if not many) of them find objectionable. 
 
In picking up the contending ends of the responses to the cartoons problem as we have just 
done we could well say that we are trotting at the outer limits of liberal society – The liberal 
position seeking to reign in Muslim responses and the Muslim responses on their part seeking to 
move beyond the boundaries circumscribed by liberal society. Conventionally it is not possible 
to follow the line of argument articulated by the Muslims as it is charged with being socially 
anarchic or as being unfair and sectarian3. As result there is very little serious intellectual 
reflection that pushes or breaks through the boundaries of liberal society4. It is in this context 
that the Indian Supreme Court’s elaboration of an exceptional model of Indian secularism 
assumes a special salience for the study of the limits of liberal politics. 
 
 
The Indian Supreme Court on Secularism 
 
In dealing with secularism in India the paper will restrict itself only to the manner in which the 
Indian constitution deals with religious freedom. There are of course a range of other provisions 
in the constitution that challenges a conception of secularism conventionally understood, 
however we stick to just one instance in the Indian constitutional scheme to unravel the larger 
problem that we started with at the beginning of the paper. Viz. Does the Indian constitution 
instantiate the limits of liberal politics? If so in what manner is it exceptional to liberal politics? 
 
The Indian constitution is very detailed in the manner in which it organizes itself in relation to 
religion. The right to religious freedom is elaborated in Articles 25-28 of the constitution. The 
first of these (Art. 25(1)) provides for the right freedom of conscience as well as the right to 
practice, profess and propagate religion. These rights are subjected to the normal liberal 
constraints of public order, health, morality etc. In addition to these expected provisos the 
Indian constitution adds on a few more constraints to the freedom of religion (in 
Art.25(2)(a)&(b)). These empower the state to make law ‘regulating or restricting regulating or 
restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated 
                                                 
3 See for instance the response of Amy Guttman to Michael Ignatieff in Michael Ignatieff and Amy Gutmann (ed), 
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatory, (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
4 Even the Marxist tradition can be read to be a distilled version of liberalism. For instance, Karl Marx on the Jewish 
question. 
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with religious practice’5 or ‘providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of 
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus’6. 
 
The right to freedom is further clarified in Article 26 expands which provides for corporate 
freedom to all religious denominations, permitting them to maintain their affairs in matters of 
religion, to own and acquire property and to administer property in accordance with law. Further 
Article 27 indicates that taxes could be levied for religious purposes as long as it is not 
specifically appropriated for the payment of expenses of any particular religion. Lastly Article 28 
of the constitution provides that religious instruction could be provided even in educational 
institutions partly funded by the state provided that the institution had been established under an 
endowment or trust, which required that religious education, is imparted. In such institutions 
however no one can be required to attend religious instruction without their consent7. 
 
Art. 27 and Art. 28 could pose problems for liberal politics as they might be seen as establishing 
religion8. However liberal politics might find a way to deal with this problem through pragmatic 
reasoning arguing that the freedom of religion, the value that disestablishment seeks to further, 
is actually furthered by some element of state support to religious and parochial institutions9. 
However Arts.25(2)(a)&(b) which gives the state sweeping powers to intervene and reform 
religion would be less amenable to liberal defence. Exploring the scope of interventionist power 
vested in the Indian state might therefore speak to our search for the limits of liberal politics. We 
do so through decisions of the Indian Supreme Court. 
 
To decide on the scope of power to regulate religion vested with the Indian state the courts had 
to work out a scheme by which the power of regulation and reform granted by Art. 25(2) (a) and 
(b) was to be reconciled with the freedom granted under Art. 25(1) and Art.26. The terms to 
reconcile this problem was first addressed by the Indian Supreme Court in a 1954 case titled The 
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Laxmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt10. 
Among other issues the case dealt with the contest by the head of a Mutt (a ‘Hindu’ religious 
and educational centre) located at a place called Shirur on the west coast of India over a ‘scheme’ 
(that is, to take over aspects of the management of a Hindu religious institution) for the Mutt 
proposed by the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments under the 
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. Under the act the 
commissioner could frame and settle a ‘scheme’ if he had reason to believe that such religious 
institution was mismanaging the resources placed under its care or being run contrary to the 
purposes for which they are founded. 
 
In contesting the ‘scheme’ framed by the commissioner the head of the Mutt claimed that the 
‘scheme’ violated its freedom to religion provided for under Art. 25(1) and Art.26 of the 
constitution. The State on its part contended that it had the broadest powers of regulating 
‘secular’ aspects related to religion under Art. 25(2)(a) and the right to freedom extended only to 
the relationship between a believer and his Deity. It was therefore incumbent on the court to 
                                                 
5 Art. 25(2)(a) 
6 Art. 25(2)(b) 
7 Article 28. 
8 A problem that has engaged the constitutional politics of the United States of America in considerable detail. 
9 For a version of this argument see Gutmann, Amy, “Religion and State in the United States: A Defense of Two-
Way Protection” in Rosenblum, Nancy L(ed), Obligations of Citizenship and the Demands of Faith, (Princeton University 
Press, 2000).,pp. 127-164. 
10 AIR 1954 SC 282 
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balance the powers given to the state under Art. 25(2)(a) and the rights given to religious groups 
under Art. 25(1) and Art. 26. 
 
In dealing with this problem the Court refused to buy the State’s position that the scope of the 
word religion in Art. 25(1) extended only to the relationship between believers and their deities. 
In rejecting this minimalist conception of religion the court held that religion implied a range of 
ritual practices that were integral to its practice. The determination of this broader notion of 
religion was to be arrived at by what the court by taking into consideration what the religious 
denomination considered essential or crucial to the understanding of its denomination. This test 
of arriving at the definition was called the essential practices test and was to balance the powers 
of the State to regulate religion and the rights of communities to religious freedom. That is, the 
essential core of the religion was inviolate and bracketed of for religious freedom and all that 
was not the essential core was liable to regulation. Interesting to note in this resolution of the 
contending pulls of the various provisions relating to religious freedom is that this essential core 
cannot be determined in any way but by the court’s doctrinal exegesis of particular religions. 
 
Though in the Shirur Mutt case the court attempted a characterisation of religion that 
substantially identified with the subjective account of the community, repeated State assertion of 
its powers arising from the interventionist structure of Art.25(2)(a)&(b) has substantially eroded 
this subjective element in the determination of the essential core of religions. This erosion is best 
captured in the comment in of Justice Gajendragadkar in the Durgah Committee case11. According 
to him ‘practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in 
that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are 
found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection 
under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinized; in other words, the protection must be 
confined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral part of it and no other’. The 
essential practices test had in a matter of speaking been transformed from answering to the 
subjective perceptions of the community to becoming the subjective determination of judges. 
 
The slide of the essential practices test into the subjective determination of judges allowed the 
courts to assume and legitimate broad ranging interventionist stances in relation to religion. 
Accordingly the court deprived the Khadims of the Ajmer Durgah some of their traditional 
rights to gifts and offerings made at the Durgah12, refused to accept the rights of those 
traditionally associated with the Nathdwara temple in Rajastan13, even against their protest 
declared the Satsangis to Hindus and threw open their temples to all other Hindus14, stipulated 
for the Anand Margis that the tandava dance was not a significant part of their religion15, 
informed Muslims that cow sacrifice was not an essential part of the Islamic faith16 and also told 
Muslims that praying in a mosque was not crucial to Islam as Muslims could pray anywhere17. 
Also, the force of the interventionist logic has been so striking that the court significantly eroded 
the right of religious denominations to administer their property in accordance with law under 
Art. 26(d), allowing the state to take over and manage many temple administrations18. 
                                                 
11 AIR 1961SC 1402 
12 Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain AIR 1961SC 1402. 
13 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajastan AIR 1963 SC1638. 
14 Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya AIR 1966 SC 1119. 
15 Jagdishwaranand v. Police Commissioner, Calcutta AIR 1984 SC 51. 
16 M.H. Qureshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 
17 Ismail Faruqui v. UOI (1994) 6 SCC 360. 
18 See Bhumi Nath v. State of J&K (1997) 2 SCC 745; Sri Adi Vishveshar of Kashi Nath (1997) 4 SCC 606; Sri Sri 
Lakshmana v. State of A.P (1996) ( SCC) 548; Pannalal v. State of A.P (1996) 2 SCC 498; Shri Jagannath Puri Management 
Committee v. Chantamani Khuntia (1997) 8 SCC 422. 
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The structure of the adjudicatory framework grounded in the essential practices test does suggest 
that there is something in Indian constitutional practice that is apart from the liberal approach to 
religion. However the adjudicatory practice is not self standing elaboration of how exactly the 
Indian practice is different from the liberal politics. To clarify the contours of this Indian model 
we have to turn our attention to the Indian Supreme Courts defence of what it understands to 
be a distinctly Indian version of the secular state. 
 
Secularism is part of the preamble to the Indian constitution and has been defended by the 
Supreme Court as part of the un-amendable basic structure of the constitution. If Indian 
secularism is exceptional to the liberal model then how do we understand the India constitution 
to be secular? We will try to answer this question by examining a few key Supreme Court 
decisions that have declared secularism to be an animating principle of the Indian constitution. 
 
The courts first declared secularism to be part of the un-amendable basic structure of the Indian 
constitution in the Keshavananda Bharathi case19. However it was not until the Bommai case20 that the 
court comprehensively argued for and defended secularism’s place in the constitution. In 
Bommai, three divergent assertions holds together (or fails to) the court’s position secularism. 
First, the court asserts that secularism was crucial to ensure the right to freedom of religion and 
the concomitant right to be treated equally by the state irrespective of religious affiliation21. In 
the words of Justice Ramaswamy ‘the state guarantees individual and corporate religious 
freedom and deals with an individual as citizen irrespective of his faith and religious belief and 
does not promote any particular religion nor prefers one against another. The concept of the 
secular State is, therefore, essential for successful working of the democratic form of 
Government’. Second, the court asserted that that secularism (the constitutional frame in 
relation to religion) derives from the Indian civilizational or cultural ethos of tolerance and 
communal harmony. Accordingly many of the judges in the case were satisfied to hold that 
secularism was embodied in, and could be derived from the diverse cultural traditions of India22. 
Third, flowing from its understanding of secularism as part of the Indian civilizational ethos, the 
court enunciated, in the words of Justice Jeevan Reddy, a positive secularism, asserting for itself a 
revolutionary and civilizational role to decisively intervene in situations where such secular 
civilizational values are under threat. 
 
The court therefore seems to be offering a two fold defence of secularism. First by defending 
the freedom of religion. Second it argues that the distinctive interventionist structure of the 
constitution is an embodiment of India’s civilisational traditions of tolerance. If an exceptional 
claim to the secular state is to be made it is to be found in the latter proposition. The question is 
how we can extract that claim. Classic arguments for toleration are grounded in the defence and 
provision of liberty23. Therefore if there is indeed distinctness to Indian traditions of toleration 
then this route is not available to us. That is, a distinct Indian secularism would have to be 
argued for differently. 
 
                                                 
19 (1973) 2 SCC 225 
20 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 
21 Ibid , Para 178. 
22 Ibid., As per Ahmadi, para 26; Sawant, para 147; Ramaswamy, paras 180, 186;  
23 The font of these arguments usually being John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, (Bobbs-Merril Educational 
Publishing, Indianapolis, 2ed, 1978). 
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The Indian Supreme Court hints on how this tradition might be accessed by asserting that it is to 
be found in ‘Hindu’ thought. The court however does not does not specify on how exactly 
Hindu thought might make for a distinct Indian secularism. That problem aside there seems to 
preliminary problem with the very intelligibility of the category ‘Hindu’ on which the court pins 
it hopes to discover an Indian secularism. Let us elaborate this through the court’s own ruling on 
the question of how one might understand the term Hindu. 
 
Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya,24 is a case that addresses temple 
entry legislation enacted in many Indian states in keeping with the constitutional mandate given 
to the state to reform regressive practices within the ‘Hindu’ religion. The present case relates to 
the followers of Swami Narayana or Satsangis, a Vaishnavite sect who claimed that they were not 
bound by the provisions of the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship Act (Entry 
Authorization) Act, 1956 to open up their temples to all classes and sections of Hindus. One of 
the claims that the Satsangis adduced before the Supreme Court was that they were not part of 
the Hindu religion and hence not bound to let all Hindus of all castes and classes enter their 
temple. Much to the protest of the community, the Supreme Court responded to their claim by 
entering into a theological exposition of the tenets of Hinduism and concluded that the 
Satsangi’s were in fact Hindus. 
 
Relying on S. Radhakrishnan, Max Muller and Monier Williams, the court describes Hinduism in 
broad and general terms finding ‘it difficult, if not impossible, to define Hindu religion or even 
adequately describe it. Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any 
one prophet; it does not worship any one God; it does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does 
not believe in any one philosophic concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites or 
performances; in fact, it does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any religion 
or creed. It may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more’25. The court then 
circumvented the obvious problems of identification that such a definition posed, by positing 
that under this great diversity there were certain basic features like the acceptance of the Vedas 
as the highest authority in religious and philosophical matters, the great world rhythm and belief 
in preexistence and rebirth26. Adapting Radhakrishnan the court then held that gaining freedom 
from unending cycle of births and rebirths was the ultimate aim of the Hindu religion. 
Interpreting Hinduism in this fashion the court held that the Satsangis were Hindus and further 
went on to hold that their views on temple entry were based on a mistaken and false 
understanding of the teachings of their founder, Swami Narayan27. Right through this argument 
however, the court never explains how Hinduism, which is nothing more than an all 
encompassing way of life, is at the same time a religion grounded in the Vedas and seeking 
freedom from the unending cycle of births and rebirths. 
 
If the category of Hindu does not stand up or disappears when put to scrutiny then it seems that 
we come against a conceptual difficulty in understanding the productions of the Indian court. 
The professedly Indian secular model does seem to push beyond the range of reference or the 
limits of the liberal model. However at the very same time it seems equally incapable of 
propping itself as conceptually distinct and carrying its own specific burdens. Why is this so? 
                                                 
24 AIR 1966 SC 1119; For a detailed account of the issues straddled by this case See Galanter, Marc, “Hinduism, 
Secularism and the Indian Judiciary” in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its critics, (Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1998)., 268-291 
25 AIR 1966 SC 1119 at p. 1128. 
26 Ibid at p. 1130 
27 Ibid at p. 1135 
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What kind of difficulty have we come up against? Why is it that the courts cannot work a 
measure of coherence to their statements on secularism? 
 
 
Towards a Conclusion 
 
To answer the puzzle that we have come up against it might be useful to introduce some 
historical constraints on our discussion. Historically summing up the project of secularism in 
contemporary India Partha Chatterjee describes it as a two fold process – that of instituting a 
modern liberal state and simultaneously of rationalising, modernising or reforming religion. 
Chatterjee also draws on a quote by B.R.Ambedkar in the constituent assembly to elaborate a 
very typical formulation of this position. According to Ambedkar  
 
“religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life from birth 
to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved I am sure 
about it that in social matters we would come to a standstill …. There is nothing extraordinary in 
saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that 
we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as maybe connected with ceremonials 
which are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating 
to tenancy or laws relating to succession, should be governed by religion …. I personally do not 
understand why religion should be given this vast expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole 
of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field’. 
 
As we have just captured it the secular project in India has been driven by liberal imagination 
tied inextricably to a project of social reform. That is, a project that believed that India could be 
liberal only if it substantially reformed itself28. Though there is a high degree of internal 
coherence29 to this position it is one that cannot be liberal or secular normally understood. The 
moment the state executes its reformist project it can no longer be secular. Framed in this 
fashion the incoherence of the secular state in India is the manifestation of the difficulties faced 
in putting the liberal project into action in India. In other words the liberal project is faced with 
its limits in trying to actualise itself in India. 
 
Despite its contradictions, the project that goes under the name of Indian secularism or Indian 
liberalism has had a life of its own under the supervision of Indian courts. That is, through the 
wide ranging adjudicatory positions that courts have taken in relation to the range of problems 
brought to them under provisions like Art. 25-28. That process of adjudication will no doubt 
continue. However what our discussion on these adjudicatory positions has brought to our 
attention is the divergence between what the court says and what it does. That is, the court 
claims to act in the name of secularism but it is difficult to understand in what manner of that 
word the Indian constitutional scheme is secular and the Supreme Court an upholder of that 
secular order? Answering this question brings back once again the issue of the limits of the 
liberal project. What we have managed to do through our discussion is indicate at the level of 
form the contradictions of the debate that goes on under the banner of Indian secularism. 
However we have not managed to explain why law and politics into and through the constitution 
took the particular shape that it did. It is this intellectual and conceptual problem that we will 
have to answer to be able to render intelligent the character of the liberal project, the contexts of 
                                                 
28 To modernise its society and rid itself of practices like caste and so on. 
29 That is, in its belief and desire to be secular 
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its relevance or alternatively the limits of its applicability30. That is, enquiry that will generate the 
explanations to understand the limits of liberal multiculturalism in the west as also the problems 
that we have noticed with cases like the Indian experiment with constitutional secularism. 
 
Though this paper will not be able to handle this problem in any depth we must hazard the 
tentative directions that enquiry has to traverse to address these problems. The anomaly that we 
have noticed in the Indian experiment with secularism was the power vested in the state to re-
order Indian religions or traditions so that that the state could then be modern and liberal. 
Explaining the problem of Indian secularism would therefore involve comprehending and 
explaining the point of view that felt obligated to reform Indian customs and traditions so as to 
be able to create a modern state. The point of view of course was and probably still is the 
European liberal tradition. The question for future research on the anomalies produced by the 
Indian secular state in is the manner in which the liberal tradition understands customs and 
traditions and the manner in which these customs and traditions have been read by the liberal 
tradition as it exported itself to farthest corners of the globe. 
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